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resources. In this regard, while I agree with Johnson about
the need for more research around quality of life of
patients with DoC to avoid misplacement of expectations
and make more informed decisions around life-sustaining
treatment, I would argue that we first need more attention
to the values at stake.
Values not only guide selection and evaluation of
behavior, people, and events; they also enable groups and
individuals to cope with reality as they “cognitively trans-
form the necessities inherent in human existence and
express them in the language of specific values about
which they can then communicate” (Schwartz 1994, 21).
Values also affect the means that are used to achieve those
ideals and goals (Cabrera 2014); that is to say, values affect
the way we use, develop, and regulate technology, as well
as how we understand consciousness and associated con-
sciousness disorders. Equally, new methods and technolo-
gies used in DoC diagnosis and prognosis can potentially
affect our values regarding those issues. Every new
method and technology presents us with a different way
to assess available facts, to weigh evidence, and to perceive
a given phenomena. An illustrative example is the way in
which functional magnetic resonance images have been
contested in court cases, since those images create the feel-
ing of certainty to the untrained eye they are seen as bias-
ing court decisions.
Taking the preceding points into consideration, we can
see why a value analysis can help reveal the role that val-
ues (both epistemic and nonepistemic) play in weighing
the consequences faced in both diagnosis and prognosis of
DoC, usefully illuminating extant social structures and
commercial market interests, and might help us to better
deal with uncertainties encountered in the diagnosis and
prognosis of DoC.&
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The Ableism of Quality of Life
Judgments in Disorders of
Consciousness: Who Bears Epistemic
Responsibility?
Joel Michael Reynolds, Emory University
After addressing significant inductive risks involved in
judgments concerning patients with disorders of con-
sciousness (DOC), Johnson argues that the best approach
is to allow “patients or their families/surrogates to make
decisions regarding treatment and nontreatment” (John-
son 2016, 40). The sole qualification Johnson places on their
decision making is that they are educated about and
“understand the uncertainties of diagnosis and prognosis”
(40). Drawing upon research in empirical psychology and
philosophy of disability, I argue that this educational qual-
ification is insufficient to address systemic ableism in qual-
ity-of-life judgments. I propose that substantive disability
education supplement stakeholders’ diagnostic education
in decision making for DOC patients.
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Johnson argues against inference by analogy from the
experience of conscious, severely disabled individuals to
unconscious or minimally conscious patients, yet such
inference is integral to decision making concerning DOC
patients. This is because part of the logic of withholding
lifesaving treatment (LST) is not simply that a patient
might be conscious and suffering, but also, as Johnson
notes, that “if she survives, [she] may be left in a severely
disabled condition, or in a DOC” (40). Whether or not the
aforementioned form of inference by analogy is reliable to
hypothesize about the experience of someone with a DOC,
the possibility of being in some type of “severely disabled
condition” is, on Johnson’s own account, still essential to
decision making concerning DOC patients. This means
that assumptions concerning the experience of living with
a disability, severe or otherwise, play a determinate, if not
central role in these judgments.
DISABILITY AND THE DIACHRONICITY OF
FLOURISHING
Longitudinal research on psychosocial adjustment in empir-
ical psychology suggests that transitioning from an able-
bodied state to one of relative impairment presents unique
challenges related to flourishing, especially when the new
state involves chronic pain or illness (Felton, Revenson, and
Hinrichsen 1984; Schmidt et al. 2012). Yet, this research also
suggests that even in cases of extreme transition, people
typically come to find new forms of flourishing and desire
to continue living, especially as pain catastrophizing sub-
sides. Because pain catastrophizing is significantly associ-
ated with pain intensity and psychological adjustment, one
can conjecture that in cases of severe disability not concomi-
tant with pain or chronic illness such positive outcomes are
even more likely (Engel et al. 2013).
The belief that one would rather die than live disabled
is widespread across Western culture and is central to the
prevalence of disability stigma and ableism (Milani 1997).
I here define ableism as the normative assumption that the
“standard” or “normal” able-body is, ceteris paribus, in and
of itself better than nonstandard or abnormal forms. As a
dominant ideology, ableism structures built and social
environments and thereby forms part of the implicit back-
ground knowledge out of which and through which
judgments are made (Thomas 2007). If research on psycho-
social adjustment suggests people not only cope but even
flourish with various forms of disability, then, contrary to
popular belief and ableist intuitions, the baseline assump-
tion should be that people would prefer to live disabled
rather than die. They would prefer this even under com-
paratively restricted conditions, even with comparatively
intense suffering, and even if it is a case of “severe dis-
ability.” (The qualification “severe” is vague and warrants
suspicion when used as if it picks out a coherent set of phe-
nomena. Its uncritical usage in bioethical literature is a
problem that deserves much more treatment, but I cannot
address it here).
EPISTEMIC EFFECTS OF DISABILITY STIGMA AND
MISJUDGMENT
A number of philosophers of science maintain that values
affect our trust in the testimony of others as well as the evi-
dential thresholds needed for justified epistemic judg-
ments (Miller 2014). Due to widespread ableism, people
with disabilities experience both hermeneutical and testi-
monial injustice (Fricker 2007). That is to say, the condi-
tions under which the testimony of people with disabilities
is given value create epistemic disadvantages on both sys-
temic and individual levels. There is thus a low likelihood
that stakeholders will accurately judge the value of a life
and its forms of flourishing as these relate to diagnostic
outcomes that involve an impaired state (Campbell 2009).
Given these disadvantages, the inductive risk of an able-
bodied person assessing the level of flourishing of some-
one living with disability is high.
MAINTAINING EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE THROUGH
APPEALS TO REASON
It is thus misleading when Johnson states that “reasonable
people will differ about what counts as an acceptable life”
(40) as though the reasonableness or the metrics in ques-
tion are themselves neutral. On the contrary, sustained
criticism and correctives are called for and especially so
when they involve well-known asymmetries of epistemic
power, such as the situations under discussion. As I
argued above, there is evidence to suggest that the metric
of acceptable life according to “reasonable people” is prej-
udicially slanted against people with disabilities in empiri-
cally problematic, if not indefensible ways. It is important
to bear in mind that the epistemic disadvantages people
with disabilities face have played a role in the generation
and justification of horrifying injustices across history,
from social ostracization and institutionalization to wide-
spread abuse and forced sterilization, among other eugenic
practices. As regards the type of cases in question, this epi-
stemic disadvantage can lead stakeholders to withdraw
LST when, with better education about disability experi-
ence, they otherwise might not. When that decision is
made without corrective educational measures, ableism
and the widespread epistemic disadvantage people with
disabilities experience are determining factors in a death
and, insofar as that disadvantage is unjust, an unjust death.
Such injustices can be addressed at least in part by further
education, information, and understanding about experi-
ences of disability.
ETHICS AND DISABILITY EDUCATION
I have argued that phenomenological approaches as well
as literary approaches to disability provide unique insights
for both medical practice and theory (Reynolds 2014).
However, one might respond that health care providers as
well as other stakeholders in decisions over patients with
DOC have limited time and resources to engage with
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various forms of knowledge about the experience of dis-
ability. This balance of constraint and judiciousness is ulti-
mately an ethical question. Eva Kittay has suggested that a
contributing factor to the devaluing and disparagement of
disability is a failure to practice what she calls epistemic
modesty: know what one does not know (Kittay 1999).
Able-bodied experience does not automatically afford one
insight into disabled experience; on the contrary, it is likely
to misunderstand, misjudge, and mischaracterize that
experience. The corollary to this epistemic virtue is the pre-
scription to learn more about the experience of disability
and to correctively value such experience in light of the
epistemic disadvantage under which it has historically
and still today operates.
While Johnson astutely notes the ableist prejudice “to
underestimate the actual quality of life experienced by peo-
ple who have disabilities” (38), measures to combat this
prejudice are not part of Johnson’s proposals. I have argued
that substantive disability education is a necessary, though
not thereby sufficient, way to combat such prejudice. To be
clear, it is not simply that disability education ought to be
“added” as an optional supplement to other forms of edu-
cation in order to promote good decision making in these
cases; it is that stakeholders cannot make well-informed
judgments concerning the uncertainties of diagnosis and
prognosis if the nature of those diagnostic and prognostic
outcomes relies upon a misunderstanding of the lived expe-
rience to which those outcomes relate. Without further edu-
cation about the lived experience of disability and given
the inductive risk of quality-of-life assessment concerning
disability, surrogates’ judgments are not likely to result in
decisions that maximally respect the autonomy of patients
and accord with their wishes. Given this state of affairs,
stakeholders have an epistemic responsibility to educate
themselves about disability experience. Disability education
is necessary and critical for judgments over the care and
treatment of patients with DOC and, mutatis mutandis, all
patients with disabilities.&
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Avoiding the Worst Possible Outcome
for Ambiguously Conscious Patients
Matthew Reisman, Albert Einstein College of Medicine
In “Inference and Inductive Risk in Disorders of Con-
sciousness,” Johnson (2016) proposes that health care
providers should “wait for more certainty” before with-
drawing life-sustaining treatment from patients with
disorders of consciousness (DOC).1 This, she argues,
would allow surrogates to make better informed and
less rushed decisions that are more in line with a DOC
patient’s preferences, so as to avoid causing the “worst
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1. Due to space constraints, I do not distinguish between disorders of consciousness.
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